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Elmore: Administrative Agencies

Administrative Agencies
by Garrett Elmore*
The past year has seen a cross section of administrative
law at work. If there is any discernible trend, it is that both
the California courts and the California legislature seem
keenly aware of the problems of balance that are involved
in agency procedures and in the judicial review of an agency's
act or decision. It may be speculated that in such balancing,
continued attention will be given to such matters as prehearing
discovery and conferences, the adequacy of findings of fact
in particular situations, and the relationship between administrative remedies and court determinations.
This article will consider the year's developments, primarily
court decisions, in the following order: prehearing investiga-
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tions and procedures, formal charge, defenses, hearing procedures, adminstrative findings, and the relationship between
agency decisions and the courts. By reason of the varied
statutes and local laws governing particular administrative
proceedings, it is not feasible to portray each case in its
particular setting in detail. Rather, the purpose of this review
is to present the year's decisions or other developments in
a highlight fashion.
Prehearing Investigations and Procedures
Of outstanding significance this past year was the unanimous decision of the California Supreme Court in Shively v.
Stewart/ according, for the first time in California, a right
of prehearing discovery to a respondent charged with a
disciplinary offense in a proceeding under the California
Administrative Procedure Act. Indeed, the implications of
Shively extend beyond proceedings under the Act. 2 Shively
applied common-law rules to permit and regulate the use
of the agency's subpoena power to secure prehearing discovery
by a respondent. Principally, it applied the analogy of
criminal-law discovery, though also using certain civil discovery techniques in matters of detail. 3
Under Shively, a respondent now has a means of compelling prehearing production of witness' statements and other
writings held by the agency. It is clear that the items need
not be admissible in evidence to compel their production,
but discovery standards apply. Conversely, as in the case
of discovery in criminal cases, there must be a showing of
more than a mere wish for the benefit of all the information
in the adversary's files. Principally, this question will arise
1. 65 Cal.2d 475, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217,
421 P.2d 65 (1966).
2. See, e.g., Endler v. Schutzbank,
68 Cal.2d 160, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297, 436
P .2d 297 (1968) (referring to Shively
for the conduct of a nonstatutory hearing).

3. Civil discovery techniques include
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
318
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upon affidavit (Cal. Code Civ. Proc.
§ 1985), use of depositions, though not
for the broad purposes provided by the
California Civil Discovery Act (Cal.
Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2016-2036), and the
application of "good cause" and attorney's work product standards (Cal.
Code Civ. Proc. § 2016(b), § 2036(a»,
in the case of broad demands for reports
gathered for the agency.
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upon a call, as in Shively, for all reports and documents gathered by investigators and employees of the agency. Shively
held that this type of call was too broad, but that respondent
might make an additional showing of need and specificity
and obtain documents that are neither privileged nor protected as the attorney's work product. To obtain information
necessary to make such a showing, the respondent was given
the right to take depositions of the agency's attorney and
executive secretary.
In brief, the legal procedure outlined in Shively contemplates that the respondent is entitled as a matter of course
to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, by the agency or
assigned hearing officer, upon filing the affidavit provided for
by Code of Civil Procedure section 1985; the agency can
move to quash, vacate, or modify the subpoena in the superior
court; and the respondent may take depositions as mentioned
above. In respect to the agency's cross right of prehearing
discovery, it was noted that the agency had sufficient resources
and legal means to enable it to secure complete information
and prepare its case before filing the accusation.
At this time, as indicated by the legislature's pre-existing
interest in the subject and the introduction of three types of
bills in 1967,4 there is some basis to believe that legislative
action may be forthcoming in this area. But it is doubtful
that the legislation will depart radically from the simple
approach of Shively, which obviously is capable of application in other administrative proceedings.
4. See Assembly Bill 24 (1965);
Assembly Bills 572, 925 and 926 (1967);
Senate Bills 942 and 1359 (1967);
Senate Resolution 388 (1967). In 1965
Assembly Bill 25, a broad bill adapted
from the California Civil Discovery
Act, passed one house. In 1967 (after
Shively) narrower bills were introduced.
One form, drafted by a State Bar committee, was based upon modified civil
discovery before a hearing officer but
with superior court review (Assembly
Bill 572 and Senate Bill 942). A

second form provided for bilateral inspection of writings and written claims
of privilege, with court review only
upon review of final decision in the
case (Senate Bill 1359). The third form
(as amended) provided for bilateral inspection of writings and the right to
take depositions, under limitations, and
subject to hearing-officer rulings (Assembly Bills 925, 926). It received the
most favorable consideration, but went
to interim study.
CAL LAW 1967
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Also of substantial importance in the area of prehearing
discovery is an amendment to the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act, effective July 4, 1967. As a public records
measure, it permits "any person" to inspect all agency records
except those in nine listed categories, two of which are similar
to that matter which under California law is protected by
privilege and work product exceptions. 5
In the area of the agency's own investigative powers, two
cases may be noted. People v. King 6 illustrates the problems
that may be encountered when the statutory authority for
an administrative subpoena also provides for immunity from
criminal prosecution by reason of compelled testimony or
compelled production of records. King holds that the giving
of compelled testimony under such a statute confers the
immunity. There is no need to claim privilege against selfincrimination if the statute does not so require. King implies,
without directly holding, that under such a statute the witness
can be compelled to produce corporate records pursuant to
the administrative subpoena, without giving rise to immunity,
so long as he is not compelled to testify.
The second case, Miley v. Harper,7 involves the legal position of the private citizen who fails in an action in which he
has instituted a complaint against a licensee. The question
is important, since it is only through the cooperation of private citizens that many regulatory laws can be effectively
administered. As to administrative proceedings generally,
the substantive law of this state was declared in the 1957
case of Hardy v. Vial. s Hardy imposes liability on the private
citizen for malicious prosecution in accord with the rule of
section 680 of Restatement (First) of Torts. In Miley, the
agency accusation had previously been decided in favor of the
respondent-licensee, and the complainant was made the de5. 5 U.S.C. § 552. See H.R. Rep. No.
1497, 89th Congo 2d sess. (1966); U.S.
Code Congo & Ad. News 2418.
6. 66 Ca1.2d 633, 58 Cal. Rptr. 571,
427 P.2d 171 (1967).
7. 248 Cal. App.2d 463, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 536 (1967).
320
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8. 48 Cal.2d 577, 311 P.2d 494, 66
A.L.R.2d 739 (1957); see also Werner V.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 65 Cal. App.
2d 667, 151 P.2d 308 (1944); Restatement (First) of Torts, Comment g, § 653.
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fendant in the civil action for malicious prosecution. A motion for summary judgment for the defendant was granted by
the trial court, largely on the basis of a supporting declaration
of the agency's attorney, which indicated that the agency itself
had made the decision to file the accusation, based on its own
investigation. On appeal, the ruling was reversed for failure
to show facts sufficient to establish a finding of "independent
investigation" and independent causation. The decision indicates that had the agency's full investigative report been part
of the record, it could have supported the motion as admissible
hearsay and sufficient facts might then have been presented
for summary judgment. It would seem, therefore, that considerable importance attaches to the agency investigation of
complaints and to the adequacy of the agency's records
thereof.
Finally, in the area of prehearing procedures, a 1967 legislative measure, if passed, would have provided for a preaccusation conference between representatives of the potential respondent and the agency.9 Its purpose was to facilitate
possible agreed dispositions, including a disposition by payment of a stipulated fine, within defined statutory limits, and
thereby avoid formal charges and later proceedings. Although the measure was vetoed, a version of the same bill
may be expected to be introduced at a future session of the
legislature.

Formal Charge
In Wisuri v. Newark School Distriet,l° the familiar rule was
restated that notice of charges need not meet the formal requirements of a complaint in a civil action. But frequently
this rule leads to difficulties, of which Sarae v. State Board
of Edueation ll is an illustrative case, in that problems may
be encountered in the use of conclusionary and evidentiary
allegations in the accusation, including alleged admissions of
the respondent. Little or no decisional law exists on this
9. Senate Bill 366 (1967).
10. 247 Cal. App.2d 239, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 490 (1966).
21
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11. 249 Cal. App.2d 58, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1967).
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form of notice, which is sometimes used by draftsmen. For
example, the accusation may allege specific misconduct or
acts and also allege surrounding circumstances, such as the
respondent's arrest, the criminal charges or the outcome thereof, and alleged admissions of other acts of misconduct made
to the arresting officer. In form, this type of accusation goes
beyond the California Administrative Procedure Act, which
provides that the accusation shall set forth in ordinary and
concise language the acts or omissions with which the respondent is charged. 12 Such additional and evidentiary allegations
place the respondent on notice of what the accuser claims.
But they may also have the undesirable effect of framing
irrelevant issues and of alleging admissions which perhaps
cannot be legally established.
Sarac involved an accusation in which additional circumstances were alleged. Unfortunately, the allegations were
at least technically incorrect in alleging that respondent had
pleaded guilty in a criminal case. Instead, he had pleaded
nolo contendere under Penal Code section 1016 (3), which
expressly states that such plea shall not be used as an admission against the defendant in a civil suit. The alleged plea
of guilty was carried into the findings. On appeal, the licensee
contended that such plea had prejudiced the trier of fact
in a case where the principal evidence was in sharp conflict.
He also objected to use of his alleged admissions of prior
misconduct at the time of arrest. The appellate court decided
neither the propriety of the accusation form nor the effect of
the respondent's alleged admissions, but affirmed the court
below on the limited ground that proof of the act of misconduct specifically alleged was sufficient.
The interesting point, not decided in Sarac, is whether a
nolo contendere plea or the conviction based thereon may be
equated with a guilty plea and treated as an admission for
purposes of an administrative proceeding. Arguments may
be made, pro and con. IS When the plea is made under Penal
Code section 1016 (3), an administrative proceeding appears
12. Cal. Government Code § 11503.
13. See comment, Nolo Contendere
322
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-Its Use and Effect, 52
408 (1964).

CA):,.

L. REV.
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to be within the spirit, though not the literal terms, of the
restraint applicable to its use as an admission in a civil suit.
But even if the plea cannot be used as an admission, it and
the criminal judgment, when arising out of the act or misconduct charged, would appear to have some relevancy to the
overall issues and, therefore, be admissible (when properly
proved) under Evidence Code sections 210 and 351. But
when received merely as "relevant evidence" the plea obviously would have much less weight than when received as an
admission.
Defenses
Whether a county permit to operate a private patrol service
can be summarily "revoked" by action of a county official,
without prior notice of charges and opportunity to present
defenses, was decided in Stewart v. County of San Mateo. 14
In a decision exploring the limits of the procedural due process rule that permits summary action where the public interest is compelling, the court determined that a private patrol
service has a sensitive relationship to the public safety. It
upheld the "revocation," but as a temporary permit "suspension." A later full-scale hearing on specific charges by a
review body, in this instance the board of supervisors, sufficiently satisfied procedural due process.
A similar question arose in Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission,15 a case of first impression in California. Acting
pursuant to a regulation of the state public utilities commission/6 a telephone company discontinued service to a subscriber. It based its decision on a letter from a chief of
police, who claimed that he had reasonable cause to believe
the telephones were being used in an illegal activity. The
regulation made such a letter sufficient, and no provision
was made for advance notice to the subscriber. The exclusive remedy of the subscriber was to file a complaint with the
commission under general law. The service was in fact re14. 246 Cal. App.2d 273, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 599 (1966). For further discussion of this case, see Leahy, Constitutional Law, in this volume.

15. 65 Cal.2d 247, 53 Cal. Rptr.
673, 418 P.2d 265 (1966).
16. 47 Cal. P.U.C. at 859-60.
CAL LAW 1967

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

323

7

Cal Law Trends
and Developments,
Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 14
Administrative
Agencies

stored upon complaint of the subscriber and pursuant to a
commission proceeding, wherein it was found there was insufficient evidence of use for illegal purposes. The Supreme
Court, considering cases dealing with postponement of the
right to hearing until after action had been taken, found there
is no rule of general application in this situation. Recognizing
the value of telephone communication to legitimate business
and First Amendment rights, the court held the summary
termination of telephone service deprived the subscriber of
property without due process of law. Looking to other jurisdictions for some guidelines, and finding varying views, the
court drew a comparison between a discontinuance of service
and a search. Consequently, a minimum requirement for a
regulation of this type is that the police satisfy an impartial
tribunal that they have "probable cause" to act, with the
same showing as is required before a magistrate to obtain a
search warrant. Additionally, the subscriber is to be promptly
afforded an opportunity to challenge the allegations of the
police and to secure restoration of service. 17
The defense of entrapment was raised unsuccessfully in
three appellate court decisions during this past year. In
O'Mara v. State Board of Pharmacy,tB state investigators had
arranged with doctors for prescriptions for dangerous drugs
in the names of fictitious patients. Apparently on the investigator's request, the respondent pharmacist refilled the prescriptions without the necessary doctor's authorization for a refill.
The licensee's contention that discipline was based on a
"trumped-up" charge was unsuccessful.
In Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage Appeals Board,t9 the filed
charges were based on three instances which took place in
1962, when a female employee of an on-sale licensee had
allegedly accepted a drink, paid for by an undercover agent,
in violation of a regulation under the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act. 20 In each instance the investigator was found
17. The federal anti-gambling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(d), follows a
different pattern. It requires prior
notice to the subscriber before discontinuance of service.
324
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18. 246 Cal. App.2d 8, 54 Cal. Rptr.
862 (1966).
19. 245 Cal. App.2d 919, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 346 (1966).
20. Cal. Adm. Code § 143.
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to have initiated the incident. The appeals board held that
public policy had been violated by the investigators' actions,
and reversed the department's thirty-day suspension order.
The trial court reversed the appeals board, and its decision
was affirmed by the appellate court. The decision notes that
enforcement policy is a matter for the agency. The entrapment contention, it was found, was insufficient as a matter
of law, for there was no tempting of innocent persons into a
violation, and there was no showing of inducing an originally
well-intentioned person into crime by persuasion and artifice. l
On a contention by the licensee that the investigators should
not have been permitted to testify as to an admission by
the employee that she had committed similar violations in the
past, the court, while recognizing that the criminal-law rule
on entrapment in this state would exclude the admission of
such evidence, held such evidence proper in this type of proceeding to show the employee's readiness to violate the law.
In Whitlow v. Board of Medical Examiners,2 three state
agents and two aides from the District Attorney's office posed
as patients and obtained prescriptions for dangerous drugs.
On several occasions, conversations in the doctor's office were
relayed by concealed transmitters to another agent outside the
building, stationed there for the purpose of recording the
conversations. The agent operating the recording equipment
was allowed to testify, over the objection of the licensee, from
a transcript based on the recordings but containing certain
obvious inaccuracies. The facts show that 60 percent of
the transcript was based upon clear transmission and the
balance upon the agent's memory, because the recording was
partially unintelligible. The appellate court found no error,
noting that the objection had been made to the agent's testimony as a whole, rather than to those portions based on
memory alone, and that nonlegal evidence can be received
in an administrative proceeding, the objection going only
as to the weight of the evidence.
1. See People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d
1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959) for definition
of entrapment.

2. 248 Cal. App.2d 478, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 525 (1967).
CAL LAW 1967
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The trial court sustained the agency's decision against the
licensee and impliedly found against entrapment. The appellate court affirmed, finding the record insufficient to establish
entrapment as a matter of law. Further, the court noted,
an effective deception was practiced upon the licensee by
reason of the fact that the so-called "patients" were enforcement agents carrying recording equipment to obtain evidence
to be used against him. But, it concluded, this deception
was allowable; it could not be said as a matter of law that
the licensee had been entrapped in the legal sense of the term
by these facts.
Were another Whitlow to arise, it is possible that recent
decisions on search and seizure and right to privacy might
preclude admission of the evidence obtained by the undercover agents. But this result seems doubtful, because business
premises were involved. Both decoy and electronic methods
of law enforcement have been upheld generally.3 Unless a
distinction can be made on the grounds that the office of a
doctor, like that of a lawyer, is semiprivate and that the nature
of the calling requires that such privacy be ensured, it seems
likely that the combined methods used in Whitlow will continue to be held legal.
Hearing Procedures

The issue was again raised this past year whether, in a
proceeding under the California Administrative Procedure
Act,4 a respondent is entitled at the close of the agency's
case-in-chief to move for a dismissal on the ground that the
facts proved do not establish a violation. In giving a negative
answer, O'Mara v. State Board of Pharmacy5 followed earlier

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/14

3. Analysis of criminal-law cases is
beyond the scope of this article. But
see generally the majority, concurring
and dissenting opinions in Katz v United
States, - U.S. - , 19 L. Ed.2d 576,
88 S.Ct. 507 (1967); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 17 L. Ed.2d 374,
87 S.Ct. 408 (1966); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 10 L. Ed.2d 462,
83 S. Ct. 1381 (1963); People v. Benford, 53 Cal.2d 1, 345 P.2d 928 (1959);
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People v. Braddock, 41 Cal.2d 794, 264
P.2d 521 (1953); People v. Miller, 248
Cal. App.2d 731, 56 Cal. Rptr. 865
(1967); People v. Ross, 236 Cal. App.2d
364, 46 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1965); and Cal.
Penal Code §§ 630-637.2.
4. Cal. Government Code §§ 1150011528.
5. 246 Cal. App.2d 8, 54 Cal. Rptr.
862 (1966).
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decisions holding that, under the act, the hearing officer must
proceed until all the evidence to be offered by all the parties
has been received.
The leading case of Ashbacker Radio Corporation v. Federal Communications Commission 6 holds that where several
applicants for a license have competing claims, they must
receive equal treatment as to opportunity to be heard. Commonly, this requirement results in consolidation of proceedings. Bostick v. Martin 7 applied the Ashbacker rule where
a new savings and loan association and an existing institution
each applied for a permit to open an office in a geographical
area where the commissioner would issue but one permit.
In Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California,S
procedural requirements were examined under the due process standard. The proceeding concerned the discipline of
certain students under ground rules set forth by the hearing
committee. Included was a detailed notice of charges sent
to each student in advance of hearing. The notice suggested
that the student might like to retain counsel, and suggested
methods for presenting evidence at the hearings. Goldberg
rejected the earlier concept that a university occupies a position of parent to child, while upholding the procedure followed
by the committee as providing the due process safeguards
declared necessary in Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education. 9
Administrative Findings

Few areas in California civil procedure have generated as
much controversy as the requirement for findings of fact in
civil cases. In California, findings are not required in small
claims suits. They are not required in justice courts or in
municipal courts where the amount in controversy is $300 or
6. 326 U.S. 327, 90 L. Ed. 108, 66
S. Ct. 148 (1945).
7. 247 Cal. App.2d 179, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 322 (1966).
8. 248 Cal. App.2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr.

463 (1967). For further discussion, see
Leahy, Constitutional Law, in this
volume.
9. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. [1961]),
cert. denied 368 U.S. 930, 7 L. Ed.2d
193, 82 S. Ct. 368 (1962),
CAL LAW 1967
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less. 10 Proposals have been made to lessen the obligation of a
trial judge to make findings in civil cases in superior and
municipal courts. Conversely, efforts have been made to encourage more meaningful findings.ll No trend for lessening
the findings requirement is discernible in administrative law.
Rather, recent California legislation and decisions place emphasis on the findings requirements imposed upon an agency
in a particular decision making process.
In Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo Association v. Board of
Permit Appeals,12 the question concerned a local zoning code
which authorized the zoning administrator to grant a variance
if he found that certain stated standards had been met and
if he made findings of fact establishing compliance with the
standards. If the administrator denied the variance application, a review board was authorized to change the administrator's ruling but was required to specify errors and to
make findings of the facts relied on. In this case the administrator denied the variance application, and the review board
overruled him. In mandamus, the trial court and the court
of appeal denied a writ. The supreme court reversed. The
majority noted the requirement of the code for "specific findings" by the review board. The decision reviewed the findings made by the review board and found them inadequate
to sustain its action. It also reviewed the record, and by
viewing it in the light most favorable to the review board,
found the findings of fact which would support it were likewise
inadequate. The requirement of the code for specific findings
by the review board was a distinguishing feature. The case
states that the rule providing that presumptions that an
agency's ruling rest upon necessary findings, and that such
findings are supported by substantial evidence, does not apply
to agencies which must state their findings and set forth the
relevant supportive facts.
10. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 117h,
117j, 632.
11. See Twentieth Biennial Report,
Cal. Judicial Council 18 (1965); Senate
Bill 483 (1965); 1959 amendments to
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11 Stats 1959, c. 637).
12. 66 Cal.2d 767, 59 Cal. Rptr. 146,
427 P.2d 810 (1967).
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Similarly, in Greyhound Lines v. Public Utilities Commission/3 the Supreme Court annulled an agency order for insufficient findings. In 1961, section 1705 of the Public Utilities Code was amended. The amendment requires the Public
Utilities Commission to set forth in its decisions, separately
stated, findings of fact and conclusions of law on material
issues.14 In September 1964, the commission on its own
motion instituted an investigation into Greyhounds' commuter
service in the San Francisco area. Following hearings, the
commission issued an order directing the carrier to establish
peak-hour commuter service on two routes. The only separately stated finding appearing in the decision was that "public
interest requires the establishment" of the service but that
"[the] [s]afety of operations will not permit the inauguration
[of portions thereof] until adequate turnouts for bus stops
are constructed by the responsible public authorities. ,,16 This
finding was held inadequate to meet the requirement of section
1705, for it did not contain findings of the basic facts upon
which the ultimate finding of "public interest" or "public
convenience and necessity" was based. Repeating reasoning
stated in an earlier decision,16 the court observed that findings
of basic facts afford a rational basis for judicial review, assist
the reviewing court to ascertain the principles relied upon by
the agency and to determine whether it acted arbitrarily,
and also assist parties to know why the case was lost and
to prepare for rehearing or review and assist others who may
be planning activities involving similar questions.
The facts in the case disclose that there were several material issues on which evidence was introduced. The carrier
questioned the jurisdiction of the commission based upon
the contention that the new routes were beyond its dedication
13. 65 Ca!.2d 811, 56 Cal. Rptr.
484, 423 P.2d 556 (1967).
14. Cal. Pub. Uti!. Code § 1705 in
pertinent parts provides: "[T]he commission shall make and file its order,
containing its decision. The decision
shall contain, separately stated, findings of fact and conclusions of law by

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1967

the commission on all issues material
to the order or decision."
15. 65 Cal.2d at 813, 56 Cal. Rptr.
at 485, 423 P.2d at 557.
16. California Motor Transport Co.
v Public Utilities Comm'n, 59 Cal.2d
270, 28 Cal. Rptr. 868, 379 P.2d 324
(1963).
CAL LAW 1967
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of property to public use, and raised the question whether
the new routes would support themselves.
Other statutes similar to section 1705 of the Public Utilities Code have also been interpreted to require findings of
the basic facts upon which the ultimate decision is made.
The federal case of Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Board17 concerned a review of a Civil Aeronautics Board
decision based on Federal Aviation Act section 1005 (f) /8
which is similar to California Public Utilities Code section
1705. The board had held extensive hearings to determine
which carrier should operate new or improved routes in the
southern parts of the United States. The board's findings
recognized one carrier's need for route support but found in
terms of quality of service offered by either carrier that neither
could offer significant advantage in providing the new service.
The court held that the findings fell short of the requirement
that the board's decision must be supported in a manner to
enable the court to review the correctness of the conclusion
reached on the basis of the findings.
In Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Commission,19 the court stated the purposes of detailed findings of fact in reasoning similar to that of the California
Supreme Court in the California Motor Transport Co. 20 case.
The question comes to mind, what are "material issues"
in an agency proceeding where the pertinent law provides
only broad standards? In the California Motor Transport
Co. case the court declared that it was within the discretion of
the agency to determine the factors material to the ultimate
decision. 1 But obviously no rule can be stated that will apply
in every case, for much will depend upon the relevant contentions of the parties and the nature of the ultimate issue.
17. 306 F.2d 739, 113 App. D.C.
132 (D.C. Cir. [1962]).
18. 49 U.S.C. § 1485(f).
19. 96 F.2d 554, 68 App. D.C. 282
(D.C. Cir. [1938]).
330
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20. California Motor Transport Co.
v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 59 Cal.2d
270, 28 Cal. Rptr. 868, 379 P.2d 324
(1963).
1. 59 Cal.2d at 275, 28 Cal. Rptr. at
870, 379 P.2d at 326.
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Further reflecting the need for findings even where the
agency's action is quasi-legislative, Bostick v. Martin 2 held
erroneous a decision of a department head denying an application for a permit for a new savings and loan association
because the denial did not contain sufficient findings of fact.
Even though no detailed requirement for findings was made
by the pertinent statute, which merely used the word "finds"
in stating the official's authority, a detailed finding was required.
Despite the emphasis that the cases under review place
on basic findings, it is to be noted that many agency matters
involve adjudicative proceedings where the fact issues are
narrow or fairly routine. Undoubtedly, a case can be made
for more informative or specific findings in such adjudicative
matters. But they are of substantial volume; for the present
at least, the California Administrative Procedure Act permits
findings to be made in the language of the pleadings or by
reference thereto. 3 Likewise, the rule has been frequently
stated in California cases that detailed and specific findings
are not required in a proceeding before an administrative
body unless the statute authorizing the proceeding requires
them.4 In quasi-legislative proceedings of a local commission
composed of laymen, findings may be informal and the standards of judicial findings need not be met. 6
Agency Decisions and the Courts

General principles of judicial review following final agency
action, at state or local level, are now well established in
California. During the past year, one substantial statutory
2. 247 Cal. App.2d 179, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 322 (1966).
3. Cal. Government Code § 11518.
4. See Martin v. Alcoholic Beverage
Control Appeals Board, 52 Cal.2d 259,
341 P.2d 291 (1959); California Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 31 Cal.2d 270, 188 P.2d 27
(1947); Webster v. Board of Dental Examiners, 17 Cal.2d 534, 110 P.2d 992
(1941); Embey Foods, Inc. v. Paul, 230

Cal. App.2d 687, 41 Cal. Rptr. 365
(1964); Palm Springs Turf Club. v. Cal.
Horse Racing Board, 155 Cal. App.2d
242, 317 P.2d 713 (1957). But see
County of Amador v. State Board of
Equalization, 240 Cal. App.2d 205, 49
Cal. Rptr. 448 (1966).
5. E.g., County of Santa Barbara v.
Purcell, Inc. 251 Cal. App.2d 169, 59
Cal. Rptr. 345 (1967).
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change was made. Judicial review functions in alcoholic
beverage control cases were transferred to the supreme court
and courts of appeal, divesting jurisdiction from the superior
courts. 6
In the broad spectrum of the relationship between agencies
and the courts, one of the most important questions confronting the courts and practitioners is the "exhaustion of remedy"
rule. In particular applications, cases decided during the past
year were divided in result; some applied the rule and others
did not. Although the issues were not framed in terms of
exhaustion, California Water and Telephone Co. v. County
of Los Angeles7 involved the same general criteria. Several
utilities and a nonprofit association to which members of the
industry belonged brought a representative suit for declaratory relief and sought to enjoin enforcement of a county
ordinance. The court set aside the ordinance on the ground
that it was unconstitutional and noted the interest of the
public and the importance of the question. The ordinance
in question, requiring administrative action, was alleged to
conflict with state law, and the court so held after first considering whether the suit should be entertained. However, in
Robins v. County of Los Angeles,S a suit was brought to
enjoin enforcement of a county ordinance requiring the licensing of a place of business employing "topless" waitresses.
The court held the suit to be premature, noting that the
plaintiff had not made application for a license and therefore
had not made available to himself the remedies against denial
of a license that are provided by the ordinance.
In Rosenfield v. Malcolm,9 the Supreme Court rejected a
contention that a dismissed employee seeking reinstatement
had overlooked his administrative remedy. The alleged remedy was provided by two county charter sections, both of
which were stated in general terms and contained no specifics
6. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2309023090.7.
7. 253 Cal. App.2d 11, 61 Cal. Rptr.
618 (1967).
8. 248 Cal. App.2d 1, 56 Cal. Rptr.
853 (1966). For further discussion of
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this case see McKinstry, State and Local
Government, in this volume.
9. 65 Cal.2d 559, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505,
421 P.2d 647 (1967). For further discussion see Leahy, Constitutional Law,
in this volume.
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for an administrative remedy. The rule was stated in the
following terms:
[M]ere possession by some official body of a continuing supervisory or investigatory power does not itself
suffice to afford an 'administrative remedy' unless the
statute or regulation under which the power is exercised
establishes clearly defined machinery for the submission,
evaluation and resolution of complaints by aggrieved
parties. 10
The exhaustion rule was also held inapplicable in Gaumer
v. County of Tehama/ 1 where a suit was brought for a refund
of real property taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed.
The administrative remedy available to the taxpayer was an
appeal to the board of supervisors, but by the time the taxpayer had received his tax bill, the prescribed period in which
the board sat had expired. The contention that the taxpayer
should have requested the board to sit in special session was
rejected. This case seems to stand on its own facts. Other
tax situations, where there is readily available a source of
administrative relief, will require the taxpayer to seek first
a decision from that body.
The decision in City of Los Angeles v. Superior Coud 2
applied the exhaustion rule to bar a civil suit by an ex-policeman for reinstatement and back pay, holding that certain city
charter provisions, not entirely explicit in the facts, provided
an administrative remedy. Procedurally, the case is of interest. The trial court had taken the view that the exhaustion
rule did not apply and had denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment. In granting a writ of prohibition against
further proceedings below, the court of appeal held that the
exhaustion rule affected the jurisdiction of the courts. The
incorrect trial court determination therefore could be corrected by writ.
California permits a declaratory judgment suit to test the
10. 65 Cal.2d at 566, 55 Cal. Rptr.
at 511, 421 P.2d at 703.
11. 247 Cal. App.2d 548, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 777 (1967).

12. 246 Cal. App.2d 73, 54 Cal. Rptr.
442 (1966).
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validity of a state administrative regulation, when the suit
is filed before a criminal or disciplinary proceeding has
commenced. By use of this procedure, a licensee often may
obtain a court ruling on a questioned administrative ruling,
without undergoing the expense and risk of agency enforcement action. During the past year an interesting variation
of this technique appeared in two cases testing the validity
of recent licensing statutes relating to the ownership of pharmacies by licensed physicians. The two cases, Magan Medical Clinic v. State Board of Medical Examineri 3 and Warrack
Medical Center Hospital v. State Board of Pharmacy,14 arose
on substantially undisputed facts. These involved differing
fact situations, so the court would be in a position to interpret the statute definitively. In form, Magan was a declaratory relief suit; Warrack was a mandamus action to compel
issuance of a pharmacy license after denial by the agency
in reliance on the questioned statute.
In the day-to-day operation of most arms of government,
there persists the continuing problem of delegation of power.
Of importance this past year in this regard is the supreme
court decision in Wilke and Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department
of Alcoholic Beverage Control/ 5 in which a divided court
again upheld California's fair trade laws in the marketing of
alcoholic beverages. The majority opinion concluded that
there was no delegation to private persons of the power to
fix prices, to regulate the business of competitors, or to exclude
a potential competitor. The court also found that there was
no unlawful delegation in the prescribed administrative and
criminal sanctions for violation, because the legislature had
prescribed sufficient guidelines. The issues as decided in
Wilke reflect the traditional test for an improper delegation
of power, and it seems clear at this time that any legislative
delegation will be difficult to contest so long as there appears
13. 249 Cal. App.2d 124, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 256 (1967). For further discussion see Brandel, Business Associations, in this volume.
14. 249 Cal. App.2d 118, 57 Cal.
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Rptr. 85 (1967). For further discussion see Brandel, Business Associations,
in this volume.
15. 65 Cal. 2d 349, 55 Cal. Rptr. 23,
420 P.2d 735 (1966).
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on the face of the statute a substantial attempt to provide
statutory guidelines.
The regard of the courts for state regulatory policy and for
agency functions is shown by the recent decision of the
supreme court in Keller v. Thornton Canning Company.16
Keller involved the application of Public Utilities Code section
3571 in its relation to the Highway Carriers Act. 17 The
court held that failure of a carrier to obtain the required
permit from the Public Utilities Commission was not a bar
to a civil suit to recover alleged undercharges to shippers,
filed at the direction of the commission. The carrier had been
instructed by a commission staff directive to review its records and collect undercharges from its shippers. Pursuant to
the directive, the carrier brought a civil action. The shippers
interposed the defense that plaintiff was barred from recovering the minimum rate because the carrier had not had the
appropriate permit from the Commission at the time the service was rendered. The trial court held for defendants. The
supreme court reversed, applying the principles stated by
Chief Justice Traynor in an earlier case. IS The Highway
Carriers Act contains no express provision barring a nonlicensed person from civil recovery. The court noted that
the paramount purpose of the statute violated is to protect
the public against ruinous carrier competition and possible
attendant evils. It concluded that the more important objective of protecting the minimum rate structure, as enforced
by the commission, should prevail over that of penalizing
the unlicensed carrier by foreclosure of access to the courts.
An earlier decision of a court of appeal denying recovery was
distinguished on the ground that an unexecuted contract call16. 66 Cal. 2d 963, 59 Cal. Rptr.
836, 429 P.2d 156 (1967).
17. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 3571 provides: "No highway contract carrier
or radial highway common carrier shall
engage in the business of transportation
of property for compensation by motor
vehicle on any public highway in this
State without first having obtained from
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the commission a permit authorizing
such operation."
18. Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball
Sons, 48 Ca1.2d 141, 308 P.2d 713
(1957), involving statutory provisions,
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7031, which
declare expressly, in the case of a contractor, that no action may be brought
or maintained in a court of this state
by the unlicensed contractor.
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ing for illegal rates had been involved. 19 The court of another
state in Johnston v. L. B. Hartz Stores, Inc. 20 already clearly
had established support for the commission's enforcement
directive and its underlying policy considerations, stating:
[P]ressure of the shippers upon the carriers for reduced
rates in violation of the statute will almost entirely be
relieved if the shippers know that notwithstanding any
illegal bargain that is made, recovery may still be had
on the basis of the minimum rate fixed by the commission. 1
Another civil suit brought by a carrier against a shipper
to recover undercharges was considered by an appellate court
last year. In Pellandini v. Pacific Limestone Products, Inc}
the court of appeal, reversing the trial court, held in effect
that the administrative determination that the rates in question were less than minimum was res judicata. The court
noted that while the shipper was not a party to the administrative proceeding, he had standing to intervene or to move
to rescind, modify, or annul the commission's decision. 3
19. Orlinoff v. Campbell, 91 Cal.
App.2d 382, 205 P.2d 67 (1949).
20. 202 Minn. 132, 277 N.W. 414
(1938).
1. 202 Minn. at 135, 277 N.W. at
416.
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2. 245 Cal. App.2d 774,54 Cal. Rptr.
290 (1966).
3. 245 Cal. App. at 777-78, 54 Cal.
Rptr. at 291-292 (1967).
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